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Book Review 
Brigitte Le Normand, Designing Tito’s Capital. Urban 
Planning, Modernism, and Socialism in Belgrade 
(University of Pittsburgh Press 2014) 
 
Kimberly Zarecor, Iowa State University 
 
In this history of New Belgrade, historian Brigitte Le Normand writes one of the first 
comprehensive municipal-level case studies of a postwar socialist urban planning project. The 
book chronicles the development of a new urban district within the capital city of Belgrade from 
the first modernist plans for the area just after World War II through several stages of stop-and-go 
development that finally accelerated in the late 1960s with the construction of both official 
housing blocks and informal settlements. The text highlights the difficulties encountered by urban 
planners, residents, and the local government to agree on the project's goals and then to 
implement them. Le Normand frames the discussion around New Belgrade's adherence to and 
deviation from the Athens Charter, Le Corbusier's 1943 text based on discussions at the 1933 
CIAM meeting. Arguing that the original 1950 master plan closely followed the functional city 
diagram from the Athens Charter, Le Normand shows that the city's subsequent development was 
far from the controlled modernist vision put forward by its earliest planners.  
Chapter one summarizes the current literature on socialist urban planning and the global 
influence of the Athens Charter. The case is made here for Yugoslav exceptionalism. Borrowing 
the idea of "in-betweeness" from Vladimir Kulić, Le Normand prefaces the book's case study by 
positing Belgrade and Yugoslavia as a unique case, not quite like Western Europe or the rest of 
the Eastern Bloc, because housing was not provided exclusively by the state, speed and 
standardization were not absolute priorities, and planning was decentralized and administrated 
locally by municipalities. Chapters two and three follow the early postwar debates about the 
planning of New Belgrade on a flood plain across the Sava River from the historic center. 
Competitions were held, committees formed, and a master plan presented in 1950 that separated 
the new city into "functionally defined zones" connected through modern transportation networks 
to the existing city. (53) This active period was followed by a decade-long postponement of the 
project due to economic problems. Since the region's population continued to increase, barracks 
and temporary housing were built on the site during this period. These provisional solutions only 
emphasized the state's inability to solve its growing housing crisis and contrasted with ideas about 
the Yugoslav 'good life' featured in magazines, exhibitions, and advertising.  
Only in the late 1950s could planners return again to the question of how New Belgrade 
should be developed. As discussed in chapter four, planners introduced the concept of sections 
(rejoni) to divide the large site into units of eight to twelve thousand inhabitants. Sections were 
comprised of blocks and buildings within the blocks designed by individual architects 
commissioned by the Town Planning Institute for site-specific projects. This gave the area a 
much more varied appearance than others in the Eastern Bloc, which were notoriously 
monotonous and standardized. Local community and retail spaces were planned, but rarely 
provided. Almost all construction in New Belgrade into the 1970s was housing, giving it a 
reputation as a bedroom community for the city center. As economic market reforms were 
introduced in the 1960s, housing also became a commodity that could be bought and sold with 
new classes of units such as luxury apartments appearing among the New Belgrade blocks.  
The final three chapters expose problems with building fast enough to satisfy the housing 
demand as the city's population grew rapidly in the 1960s. What Le Normand terms "rogue 
construction," outside of state control, started all around the site and in adjacent communities as 
inhabitants built their own single-family homes on still open land since official units were so 
difficult to acquire. (148) The Town Planning Institute both acknowledged and tried to ignore the 
impact of these informal settlements until it decided to work with rogue builders in the mid-1960s 
to develop parcels at the edges of the city. Sociologists used the construction problems to launch 
attacks against modernist planning, which coincided with similar critiques in the United States 
and Western Europe. Rising social inequality, the slow pace of construction, and the unplanned 
settlement patterns all contributed to the sense that the original strategy for New Belgrade was 
fundamentally flawed. Planners wanted a new approach for a 1972 master plan. Working with 
consultants from Wayne State University in Detroit, the Town Planning Institute looked to 
cybernetics and early computer modeling to develop a data-driven approach to its now chaotic 
site.  
Although useful as an analytical framework, Le Normand overplays the Athens Charter 
concept in the text. Portrayed here a set of instructions to be followed or rejected, the constant 
reference back to the 1943 diagram stops the analysis from developing a finer grain that would 
embed the debates around New Belgrade in CIAM's own changing discourse and postwar 
planning practices in general. The internal and local approach to the case study has the drawback 
that international trends are not woven enough into the story. Missing in particular are references 
to Scandinavian projects like Vällingby in Sweden or the plans for Chandigarh or Brasilia, which 
have both been studied as examples where the Athens Charter model develops deformities at the 
micro-scale. Despite these problems of context and comparison, this is a meticulously researched 
and thoughtfully presented case study that will be relevant to all scholars interested in global 
postwar urban planning.  
